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Abstract
Data collection under local differential privacy (LDP) has
been mostly studied for homogeneous data. Real-world appli-
cations often involve a mixture of different data types such
as key-value pairs, where the frequency of keys and mean
of values under each key must be estimated simultaneously.
For key-value data collection with LDP, it is challenging to
achieve a good utility-privacy tradeoff since the data contains
two dimensions and a user may possess multiple key-value
pairs. There is also an inherent correlation between key and
values which if not harnessed, will lead to poor utility. In this
paper, we propose a locally differentially private key-value
data collection framework that utilizes correlated perturba-
tions to enhance utility. We instantiate our framework by two
protocols PCKV-UE (based on Unary Encoding) and PCKV-
GRR (based on Generalized Randomized Response), where
we design an advanced Padding-and-Sampling mechanism
and an improved mean estimator which is non-interactive.
Due to our correlated key and value perturbation mechanisms,
the composed privacy budget is shown to be less than that
of independent perturbation of key and value, which enables
us to further optimize the perturbation parameters via bud-
get allocation. Experimental results on both synthetic and
real-world datasets show that our proposed protocols achieve
better utility for both frequency and mean estimations under
the same LDP guarantees than state-of-the-art mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Differential Privacy (DP) [12, 13] has become the de facto
standard for private data release. It provides provable privacy
protection, regardless of the adversary’s background knowl-
edge and computational power [8]. In recent years, Local
Differential Privacy (LDP) has been proposed to protect pri-
vacy at the data collection stage, in contrast to DP in the
centralized setting which protects data after it is collected and
stored by a server. In the local setting, the server is assumed
to be untrusted, and each user independently perturbs her raw
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Figure 1: A motivating example (movie rating system).
data using a privacy-preserving mechanism that satisfies LDP.
Then, the server collects the perturbed data from all users to
perform data analytics or answer queries from users or third
parties. The local setting has been widely adopted in practice.
For example, Google’s RAPPOR [14] has been employed in
Chrome to collect web browsing behavior with LDP guaran-
tees; Apple is also using LDP-based mechanisms to identify
popular emojis, popular health data types, and media playback
preference in Safari [5].
Early works under LDP mainly focused on simple statisti-
cal queries such as frequency/histogram estimation on categor-
ical data [22] and mean estimation of numerical data [9,11,16].
Later works studied more complex queries or structured data,
such as frequent item/itemset mining of itemset data [17, 23],
computing mean value over a single numeric attribute of mul-
tidimensional data [19,21,26], and generating synthetic social
graphs from graph data [18]. However, few of them studied
the hybrid/heterogeneous data types or queries (e.g., both
categorical and numerical data). Key-value data is one such
example, which is widely encountered in practice.
As a motivating example, consider a movie rating system
(shown in Figure 1), each user possesses multiple records of
movies (the keys) and their corresponding ratings (the values),
that is, a set of key-value pairs. The data collector (the server)
can aggregate the rating records from all users and analyze
the statistical property of a certain movie, such as the ratio of
people who watched this movie (frequency) and the average
rating (value mean). Then, the server (or a third party) can
provide recommendations by choosing movies with both high
frequencies and large value means.
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The main challenges to achieve high utility for key-value
data collection under LDP are two-fold: multiple key-value
pairs possessed by each user and the inherent correlation be-
tween the key and value. For the former, if all the key-value
pairs of a user are reported to the server, each pair will split
the limited privacy budget ε (the larger ε is, the more leakage
is allowed), which requires more noise/perturbation for each
pair. For the latter, correlation means reporting the value of
a key also discloses information about the presence of that
key. If the key and value are independently perturbed each
under ε-LDP, overall it satisfies 2ε-LDP according to sequen-
tial composition, which means more perturbation is needed
for both key and value to satisfy ε-LDP overall. Intuitively,
jointly perturbing key and value by exploiting such correla-
tion may lead to less overall leakage; however, it is non-trivial
to design such a mechanism that substantially improves the
budget composition.
Recently, Ye et al. [25] are the first to propose PrivKVM to
estimate the frequency and mean of key-value data. Because
of key-value correlation, they adopt an interactive protocol
with multiple rounds used to iteratively improve the estima-
tion of a key’s mean value. The mean estimation in PrivKVM
is shown to be unbiased when the number of iterations is
large enough. However, it has three major limitations. First,
multiple rounds will enlarge the variance of mean estimation
(as the privacy budget is split in each iteration) and reduce
the practicality (since users need to be online). Second, they
use a sampling protocol that samples an index from the do-
main of all keys to address the first challenge, which does
not work well for a large key domain (explained in Sec. 4.2).
Third, although their mechanism considers the correlation
between key and value, it does not lead to an improved budget
composition for LDP (discussed in Sec. 5.2).
In this paper, we propose a novel framework for Locally
Differentially Private Correlated Key-Value (PCKV) data
collection with a better utility-privacy tradeoff. It enhances
PrivKVM in four aspects, where the first three address the
limitations of PrivKVM, and the last one further improves the
utility based on optimized budget allocation.
First, we propose an improved mean estimator which only
needs a single-round. We divide the calibrated sum of values
of a certain key by the calibrated frequency of that key (whose
expectation is the true frequency of keys), unlike PrivKVM
which uses uncalibrated versions of both (value sum and fre-
quency) that is skewed by inputs from the fake keys and their
values. To fill the values of fake keys, we only need to ran-
domly generate values with zero mean (which do not change
the expectation of estimated value sum), eliminating the need
to iteratively estimate the mean for fake value generation. Al-
though the division of two unbiased estimators is not unbiased
in general, we show that it is a consistent estimator (i.e., the
bias converges to 0 when the number of users increases). We
also propose an improved estimator to correct the outliers
when estimation error is large under a small ε.
Second, we adapt an advanced sampling protocol called
Padding-and-Sampling [23] (originally used in itemset data)
to sample one key-value pair from the local pairs that are
possessed by the user to make sure most of sampled data
are useful. Such an advanced sampling protocol can enhance
utility, especially for a large domain size.
Third, as a byproduct of uniformly random fake value gen-
eration (when a non-possessed key is reported as possessed),
we show that the proposed correlated perturbation strategy
consumes less privacy budget overall than the budget sum-
mation of key and value perturbations, by deriving a tighter
bound of the composed privacy budget (Theorem 2 and The-
orem 3). It can provide a better utility-privacy tradeoff than
using the basic sequential composition of LDP which assumes
independent mechanisms. Note that PrivKVM directly uses
sequential composition for privacy analysis.
Fourth, since the Mean Square Error (MSE) of frequency
and mean estimations in our scheme can be theoretically ana-
lyzed (in Theorem 4) with respect to the two privacy budgets
of key and value perturbations, it is possible to find the opti-
mized budget allocation with minimum MSE under a given
privacy constraint (budget). However, the MSEs depend on
the true frequency and value mean that are unknown in prac-
tice. Thus, we derive near-optimal privacy budget allocation
and perturbation parameters in closed-form (Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3) by minimizing an approximate upper bound of the
MSE. Our near-optimal allocation is shown (in both theoreti-
cal and empirical) to outperform the naive budget allocation
with an equal split.
Main contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) We propose the PCKV framework with two mecha-
nisms PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR under two baseline per-
turbation protocols: Unary Encoding (UE) and Generalized
Randomized Response (GRR). Our scheme is non-interactive
(compared with PrivKVM) as the mean of values is estimated
in one round. We theoretically analyze the expectation and
MSE and show its asymptotic unbiasedness.
(2) We adapt the Padding-and-Sampling protocol [23] for
key-value data, which handles large domain better than the
sampling protocol used in PrivKVM.
(3) We show the budget composition of our correlated per-
turbation mechanism, which has a tighter bound than using
the sequential composition of LDP.
(4) We propose a near-optimal budget allocation approach
with closed-form solutions for PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR un-
der the tight budget composition. The utility-privacy tradeoff
of our scheme is improved by both the tight budget composi-
tion and the optimized budget allocation.
(5) We evaluate our scheme using both synthetic and real-
world datasets, which is shown to have higher utility (i.e., less
MSE) than existing schemes. Results also validate the correct-
ness of our theoretical analysis and the improvements of the
tight budget composition and optimized budget allocation.
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2 Related Work
The main task of local differential privacy techniques is to
analyze some statistic information from the data that has
been perturbed by users. Erlingsson et al. [14] developed
RAPPOR satisfying LDP for Chrome to collect URL click
counts. It is based on the ideas of Randomized Response
[24], which is a technique for collecting statistics on sensitive
queries when a respondent wants to retain confidentiality.
In the basic RAPPOR, they adopt unary encoding to obtain
better performance of frequency estimation. Wang et al. [22]
optimized the parameters of basic RAPPOR by minimizing
the variance of frequency estimation. There are a lot of works
that focus on complex data types and complex analysis tasks
under LDP. Bassily and Smith [6] proposed an asymptotically
optimal solution for building succinct histograms over a large
categorical domain under LDP. Qin et al. [17] proposed a
two-phase work named LDPMiner to achieve the heavy hitter
estimation (items that are frequently possessed by users) over
the set-valued data with LDP, where each user can have any
subset of an item domain with different length. Based on the
work of LDPMiner, Wang et al. [23] studied the same problem
and proposed a more efficient framework to estimate not only
the frequent items but also the frequent itemsets.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two works on
key-value data collection under LDP. Ye et al. [25] are the
first to propose PrivKV, PrivKVM, and PrivKVM+, where
PrivKVM iteratively estimates the mean to guarantee the un-
biasedness. PrivKV can be regarded as PrivKVM with only
one iteration. The advanced version PrivKVM+ selects a
proper number of iterations to balance the unbiasedness and
communication cost. Sun et al. [20] proposed another estima-
tor for frequency and mean under the framework of PrivKV
and several mechanisms to accomplish the same task. They
also introduced conditional analysis (or the marginal statis-
tics) of key-value data for other complex analysis tasks in
machine learning. However, both of them use the naive sam-
pling protocol and neither of them analyzes the tighter budget
composition caused by the correlation between perturbations
nor considers the optimized budget allocation.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Local Differential Privacy
In the centralized setting of differential privacy, the data ag-
gregator (server) is assumed to be trusted who possesses all
users’ data and perturbs the query answers. However, this
assumption does not always hold in practice and may not
be convincing enough to the users. In the local setting, each
user perturbs her input x using a mechanism M and uploads
y=M (x) to the server for data analysis, where the server can
be untrusted because only the user possesses the raw data of
herself; thus the server has no direct access to the raw data.
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [10]). For
a given ε ∈ R+, a randomized mechanism M satisfies ε-LDP
if and only if for any pair of inputs x,x′, and any output y, the
probability ratio of outputting the same y should be bounded
Pr(M (x) = y)
Pr(M (x′) = y)
6 eε (1)
Intuitively, given an output y of a mechanism, an adversary
cannot infer with high confidence (controlled by ε) whether
the input is x or x′, which provides plausible deniability for
individuals involved in the sensitive data. Here, ε is a parame-
ter called privacy budget that controls the strength of privacy
protection. A smaller ε indicates stronger privacy protection
because the adversary has lower confidence when trying to
distinguish any pair of inputs x,x′. A very good property of
LDP is sequential composition, which guarantees the overall
privacy for a sequence of mechanisms that satisfy LDP.
Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition of LDP [15]). If a
randomized mechanism Mi : D → Ri satisfies εi-LDP for
i = 1,2, · · · ,k, then their sequential composition M : D →
R1×R2×·· ·×Rk defined by M = (M1,M2, · · · ,Mk) satis-
fies (∑ki=1 εi)-LDP.
According to sequential composition, a given privacy bud-
get for a computation task can be split into multiple portions,
where each portion corresponds to the budget for a sub-task.
3.2 Mechanisms under LDP
Randomized Response. Randomized Response (RR) [24]
is a technique developed for the interviewees in a survey to
return a randomized answer to a sensitive question so that
the interviewees can enjoy plausible deniability. Specifically,
each interviewee gives a genuine answer with probability p
or gives the opposite answer with probability q = 1− p. In
order to satisfy ε-LDP, the probability is selected as p = e
ε
eε+1 .
RR only works for binary data, but it can be extended to
apply for the general category set {1,2, · · · ,d} by Generalized
Randomized Response (GRR) or Unary Encoding (UE).
Generalized Randomized Response. The perturbation
function in Generalized Randomized Response (GRR) [22] is
Pr(M (x) = y) =
{
p = e
ε
eε+d−1 , if y = x
q = 1−pd−1 , if y 6= x
where x,y ∈ {1,2, · · · ,d} and the values of p and q guarantee
ε-LDP of the perturbation (because pq = e
ε).
Unary Encoding. The Unary Encoding (UE) [22] converts
an input x = i into a bit vector x = [0, · · · ,0,1,0, · · · ,0] with
length d, where only the i-th position is 1 and other positions
are 0s. Then each user perturbs each bit of x independently
with the following probabilities (q6 0.56 p)
Pr(y[k] = 1) =
{
p, if x[k] = 1
q, if x[k] = 0
(∀k = 1,2, · · · ,d)
3
where y is the output vector with the same size as vector x.
It was shown in [22] that this mechanism satisfies LDP with
ε= ln p(1−q)(1−p)q . The selection of p and q under a given privacy
budget ε varies for different mechanisms. For example, the
basic RAPPOR [14] assigns p = e
ε/2
eε/2+1
and q = 1− p, while
the Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE) [22] assigns p= 12 and
q = 1eε+1 , which is obtained by minimizing the approximate
variance of frequency estimation.
Frequency Estimation for GRR, RAPPOR and OUE.
After receiving the perturbed data from all users (with size
n), the server can compute the observed proportion of users
who possess the i-th item (or i-th bit), denoted by fi. Since
the perturbation is biased for different items (or bit-0 and
bit-1), the server needs to estimate the observed frequency by
an unbiased estimator fˆi =
fi−q
p−q , whose Mean Square Error
(MSE) equals to its variance [22]
MSE fˆi = Var[ fˆi] =
q(1−q)
n(p−q)2 +
f ∗i (1− p−q)
n(p−q)
where f ∗i is the ground truth of the frequency for item i.
4 Key-Value Data Collection under LDP
4.1 Problem Statement
System Model. Our system model (shown in Figure 1) in-
volves one data server and a set of users U with size |U|= n.
Each user possesses one or multiple key-value pairs 〈k,v〉,
where k ∈ K (the domain of key) and v ∈ V (the domain
of value). We assume the domain size of key is d, i.e.,
K = {1,2, · · · ,d}, and domain of value is V = [−1,1] (any
bounded value space can be linearly transformed into this
domain). The set of key-value pairs possessed by a user is
denoted as S (or Su for a specific user u∈U). After collecting
the perturbed data from all users, the server needs to estimate
the frequency (the proportion of users who possess a certain
key) and the value mean (the averaged value of a certain key
from the users who possess such key), i.e.,
f ∗k =
∑u∈U 1Su(〈k, ·〉)
n
, m∗k =
∑u∈U,〈k,v〉∈Su v
n · f ∗k
where 1Su(〈k, ·〉) is 1 when 〈k, ·〉 ∈ Su and is 0 otherwise.
Threat Model. We assume the server is untrusted and each
user only trusts herself because the privacy leakage can be
caused by either unauthorized data sharing or breach due to
hacking activities. Therefore, the adversary is assumed to have
access to the output data of all users and know the perturbation
mechanism adopted by the users. Note that we assume all
users are honest in following the perturbation mechanism,
thus we do not consider the case that some users maliciously
upload bad data to fool the server.
Objectives and Challenges. Our goal is to estimate fre-
quency and mean with high accuracy (i.e., small Mean Square
Error) under the required privacy constraint (i.e., satisfying
ε-LDP). However, the task is not trivial for key-value data
due to the following challenges: (1) Considering each user
can possess multiple key-value pairs (the number of pairs can
be different for users), if each user uploads multiple pairs,
then each pair needs to consume budget, leading to a smaller
budget and larger noise in each pair. On the other hand, if
simply sampling an index j from the domain and uploading
the key-value pair regarding the j-th key (which is used in
PrivKVM [25]), we cannot make full use of the original pairs.
Therefore, an elaborately designed sampling protocol is nec-
essary in order to estimate the frequency and mean with high
accuracy. (2) Due to the correlation between key and value
in a key-value pair, the perturbation of key and value should
be correlated. If a user reports a key that does not exist in her
local data, she has to generate a fake value to guarantee the
indistinguishability; however, how to generate the fake value
without any prior knowledge and how to eliminate the influ-
ence of fake values on the mean estimation are challenging
tasks. (3) Considering the key and value are perturbed in a cor-
related manner, the overall perturbation mechanism may not
leak as much information as two independent perturbations
do (by sequential composition). Therefore, precisely quanti-
fying the actually consumed privacy budget can improve the
privacy-utility tradeoff of the overall key-value perturbation.
4.2 PrivKVM
To the best of our knowledge, PrivKVM [25] is the only pub-
lished work on key-value data collection in the LDP setting
(note that another existing work [20] is a preprint). It utilizes
one iteration for frequency estimation and multiple iterations
to approximately approach the unbiased mean estimation. We
briefly describe it as follows. Assume the total privacy budget
is ε, and the number of iterations is c. In the first iteration,
each user randomly samples an index j from the key domain
K with uniform distribution (note that j does not contain
any private information). If the user processes key k = j with
value v, then she perturbs the key-value pair 〈1,v〉; if not, the
user perturbs the key-value pair 〈0, v˜〉, where v˜ is initialized as
0 in the first iteration. In both cases, the input is perturbed with
key-budget ε2 and value-budget
ε
2c . Then, each user uploads
the index j and one perturbed key-value pair 〈0, ·〉 or 〈1, ·〉 to
the server and the server can compute the estimated frequency
fk and mean mk (k ∈ K ) after collecting the perturbed data
from all users, where the counts of output values will be cor-
rected before estimation when outliers occur. In the remaining
iterations, each user perturbs her data with a similar way but
v˜ = mk (the estimated mean of the previous round) and the
budget for key perturbation is 0. Then, the server updates
the mean mk in the current iteration. By multiple rounds of
interaction between users and the server, the mean estimation
is approximately unbiased, and the sequential composition
guarantees LDP with privacy budget ε2 +
ε
2c · c = ε.
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① Privacy Budget Allocation 
and Perturbation 
Probability Computation
𝜖: the total privacy budget 
PCKV-UE:  𝜖 → {𝜖1, 𝜖2} → {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑝}
PCKV-GRR:  𝜖 → 𝜖1, 𝜖2 → {𝑎, 𝑝}
② Sampling
𝑆 → 𝑥 = ⟨𝑘, 𝑣⟩
③ Perturbation
PCKV-UE:  𝑥 → y (vector)
PCKV-GRR: 𝑥 → 𝑦′ = 𝑘′, 𝑣′
④ Aggregation
PCKV-UE: y[𝑘] → 𝑛1, 𝑛2
PCKV-GRR: 𝑦′ → 𝑛1, 𝑛2
⑤ Estimation
𝑛1, 𝑛2 → { መ𝑓𝑘, ෝ𝑚𝑘}
Set Up User-Side Server-Side
𝜖1: budget for key perturbation
𝜖2: budget for value perturbation
𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑝: perturbation probabilities
y[𝑘] ∈ {1,−1,0}
𝑛1: supporting number of 1
𝑛2: supporting number of -1
𝑆: the set of key-value pairs
𝑥: the sampled key-value pair
y or 𝑦′: the output of each user
Figure 2: The overview of our PCKV framework.
There are three limitations of PrivKVM.
(1) To achieve approximate unbiasedness, PrivKVM needs
to run multiple rounds. This requires all users online during
all rounds, which is impractical in many application scenarios.
Also, the multiple iterations only guarantee the convergence
of expectation of mean estimation (i.e., the bias theoretically
approaches zero when c→ ∞), but the variance of mean esti-
mation will be very large for a large c because the budget ε2c
(for value perturbation in each round) is very small. Note that
the estimation error depends on both bias and variance.
(2) The sampling protocol in PrivKVM may not work well
for a large domain. When the domain size d = |K | is very
large (such as millions) and each user only has a relatively
small number of key-value pairs (such as less than 10), uni-
formly sampling an index from the large key domainK makes
users rarely upload the information of the keys that they pos-
sess, resulting in a large variance of frequency and mean
estimations. Also, when the number of users n is not very
large compared with domain size (such as n< 2d), some keys
may not be sampled, then the mean estimation does not work
for such keys because of no samples.
(3) Although PrivKVM considers the correlation between
key and value, it does not lead to an improved budget compo-
sition for LDP, which will be discussed in Sec. 5.2.
5 Proposed Framework and Mechanisms
The overview of our PCKV framework is shown in Figure 2,
where two specific mechanisms are included. The first one
is PCKV-UE, which outputs a bit vector, and the second one
is PCKV-GRR, which outputs a key-value pair. Note that
the two mechanisms have similar ideas but steps 1© 3© 4© are
slightly different. In step 1©, the system sets up some environ-
ment parameters (such as the total budget ε and domain size
d), which can be used to allocate the privacy budget for key
and value perturbations and compute the perturbation proba-
bilities in mechanisms, where the optimized privacy budget
allocation is discussed in Sec. 5.4. In step 2© and step 3©,
each user samples one key-value pair from her local data and
privately perturbs it, where the sampling protocol is discussed
in Sec. 5.1 and the perturbation mechanisms (PCKV-UE and
PCKV-GRR) are proposed in Sec. 5.2. The perturbation of
value depends on the perturbation of key, which is utilized to
improve the privacy budget composition. In step 4© and step
5©, the server aggregates the perturbed data from all users and
estimates the frequency and mean, shown in Sec. 5.3.
Algorithm 1 Padding-and-Sampling for Key-Value Data
Input: The set of key-value pairs S , padding length `
Output: Sampled key-value pair 〈k,v〉, where k ∈K ′ and v ∈ {1,−1}.
1: Randomly draw B∼ Bernoulli(η), where η= |S |max{|S |,`} .
2: if B = 1 then
3: Randomly sample one key-value pair 〈k,v∗〉 from S with discrete
uniform distribution. //sample a non-dummy key-value pair
4: else
5: Set v∗ = 0 and randomly draw k from {d+1, · · · ,d′} with discrete
uniform distribution. //sample a dummy key-value pair
6: end if
7: Discretize the value: v← 1 w.p. 1+v∗2 or v←−1 w.p. 1−v
∗
2
8: Return x = 〈k,v〉.
5.1 Sampling Protocol
This subsection corresponds to step 2© in Figure 2. Consid-
ering each user may possess multiple key-value pairs, if the
user perturbs and uploads all pairs, then each pair would con-
sume the budget and the noise added in each pair becomes
too large. Therefore, a promising solution is to upload the per-
turbed data of one pair (by sampling) to the server, which can
avoid budget splitting. As analyzed in Sec. 4.2, the sampling
protocol used in PrivKVM does not work well for a large
domain. In this paper, we use an advanced protocol called
Padding-and-Sampling [23] to improve the performance.
The Padding-and-Sampling protocol [23] is originally used
for itemset data, where each user samples one item from pos-
sessed items rather than sampling an index from the domain
of all items. To make the sampling rate the same for all users,
each user first pads her items into a uniform length ` by some
dummy items from a domain of size `. Although there may
still exist unsampled items, this case occurs only for infre-
quent items, thus the useful information of frequent items still
can be reported with high probability.
Our Sampling Protocol. The original Padding-and-
Sampling protocol is designed for itemset data and does not
work for key-value data. Thus, we modify it to handle the
key-value data, shown in Algorithm 1, where d′ = d + `,
K ′ = {1,2, · · · ,d′}, and parameter η= |S |max{|S |,`} represents
the probability of sampling the non-dummy key-value pairs.
The main differences are two-fold. First, we sample one key-
value pair instead of one item, and if a dummy key is sampled,
we assign a fake value v∗ = 0. Second, after sampling, the
value is discretized into 1 or −1 for the value perturbation to
implement randomized response based mechanism, where the
discretization in Line-7 guarantees the unbiasedness because
E[v] = 1+v∗2 − 1−v
∗
2 = v
∗.
By using Algorithm 1, the large domain size does not affect
the probability of sampling a possessed key because it samples
from key-value pairs possessed by users. Also, even when the
user size is less than the domain size, the frequent keys still
have larger probabilities to be sampled by users while only
the infrequent keys may not be sampled. Therefore, the two
problems of naive sampling protocol in PrivKVM (discussed
in Sec 4.2) can be solved by our advanced one.
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⟨1, 𝑣∗⟩
⟨0, 0⟩
⟨1, 1⟩
⟨1, −1⟩
⟨1, 1⟩
⟨1, −1⟩
⟨0, 0⟩
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⟨1, 0⟩
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⟨1, 1⟩
⟨1, −1⟩
Raw data in 
k-th element 
Discretization 
of Value
Perturbation 
of Key
Perturbation 
of Value
𝑎
𝑎
𝑝
𝑝
0.5
True key
Fake key
Figure 3: Perturbation of k-th element (∀k ∈K ′) in PCKV-UE.
For the selection of `, a smaller ` will underestimate the
frequency thus lead to a large bias, while a larger one will
enlarge the variance [23]. Thus, it should balance the tradeoff
between bias and variance. A baseline strategy of selecting a
good ` was proposed in [23] for itemset data. They set ` as
the 90th percentile of the length of inputs, where the length
distribution is privately estimated from a subset of users. Note
that the users are partitioned into multiple groups, where each
group participates in only one task (the pre-task to estimate
length distribution or the main task to estimate frequency);
thus ε-LDP in each group guarantees ε-LDP for the whole
group of users. However, how to select an optimal partition
ratio for length distribution estimation (more users in this
task can provide more accurate length estimation but leads
to fewer users for the main task which impacts frequency
and mean estimation) and how to select an optimal percentile
(a larger percentile leads to less bias but more variance) are
non-trivial tasks. Therefore, in this paper, we select some
reasonable ` for different datasets in experiments for compar-
ing with PrivKVM (which uses naive sampling protocol) and
leave the strategies of finding the optimized partition ratio
and percentile for estimating ` as future work.
5.2 Perturbation Mechanisms
This subsection corresponds to step 3© in Figure 2. By Algo-
rithm 1, each user samples one key-value pair x= 〈k,v〉 as the
input of perturbation, where the domain is k∈K ′,v∈{1,−1}.
If a non-possessed key is reported as possessed (in PCKV-
UE), we need to generate fake value. If the original key is
perturbed into another one (in PCKV-GRR), the original value
is useless for the mean estimation since the original key is
not reported to the server. In both cases, we can generate
value with discrete uniform distribution to avoid influence
of values of different keys. We will show that such a strat-
egy can provide a tighter composition (in Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3), which is reflected as a smaller total budget of
the composed perturbation than sequential composition. By
combining the above idea with sampling protocol for key-
value data (Algorithm 1) and two basic LDP mechanisms
(UE and GRR) in Sec. 3.2, we obtain two mechanisms under
the PCKV framework: PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR.
PCKV-UE Mechanism. In Unary Encoding (UE), the
original input is encoded as a bit vector, where only the input-
corresponding bit is 1 and other bits are 0s, then each bit flips
Algorithm 2 PCKV-UE
Input: The set of key-value pairs S , perturbation probabilities a,b and p,
where a, p ∈ [ 12 ,1) and b ∈ (0, 12 ].
Output: Vector y ∈ {1,−1,0}d′ , where d′ = d+ `.
1: Sample one key-value pair x = 〈k,v〉 from S by Algorithm 1.
2: Independently perturb the k-th element and other elements (∀i ∈K ′\k)
y[k] =

v, w.p. a · p
−v, w.p. a · (1− p)
0, w.p. 1−a
, y[i] =

1, w.p. b/2
−1, w.p. b/2
0, w.p. 1−b
3: Return vector y.
with specified probabilities to generate the output vector. For
key-value data, denote the element in k-th position (regarding
the key k) as 〈i,v〉 with domain {〈1,1〉,〈1,−1〉,〈0,0〉}, i.e.,
the sampled pair x = 〈k,v〉 is encoded as a vector x, where
only the k-th element is 〈1,±1〉 and others are 〈0,0〉. Then,
the perturbation of key i→ i′ in each element can be imple-
mented by 1→ 1 w.p. a or 0→ 1 w.p. b (where b6 0.56 a).
For value perturbation v→ v′, we discuss three cases:
Case 1. If 1→ 1, then the value is maintained (v′ = v) with
probability p or flipped (v′ =−v) with probability 1− p.
Case 2. If 1→ 0 or 0→ 0, then the output value can be set
to v′ = 0 because the key k is reported as not possessed.
Case 3. If 0→ 1, then the fake value v′ = 1 or v′ =−1 are
assigned with probability 0.5 respectively.
The discretization and perturbation of PCKV-UE are shown
in Figure 3. For brevity, we use three states {1,−1,0} to
represent the key-value pairs {〈1,1〉,〈1,−1〉,〈0,0〉} in each
position of output vector y. If the sampled pair is x = 〈k,1〉,
then only the k-th element of the encoded vector x is 1 (other
elements are 0s), and the probability of y[k] = 1 is
Pr(y[k] = 1|x = 〈k,1〉) = Pr(y[k] = 1|x[k] = 1) = ap
Similarly, we can compute the perturbation probabilities of
other elements in all possible cases, shown in Algorithm 2.
Privacy Analysis of PCKV-UE. In PCKV-UE, the key is
perturbed by Unary Encoding (UE) with budget ε1 = ln a(1−b)b(1−a)
(refer to Sec. 3.2), and the value is perturbed by Randomized
Response (because the discretized value is 1 or −1) with bud-
get ε2 = ln p1−p (then p =
eε2
eε2+1 ). Also, the key and value are
perturbed in a correlated manner. That is, the value perturba-
tion mechanism depends on both the input key and perturbed
key of a user. Intuitively, correlated perturbation may leak
less information than independent perturbation, i.e., the total
privacy budget ε can be less than the summation ε1+ ε2. The
following theorem shows the tight budget composition of our
PCKV-UE mechanism.
Theorem 2 (Budget Composition of PCKV-UE). Assume
the privacy budgets for key and value perturbations in PCKV-
UE (Algorithm 2) are ε1 and ε2 respectively, i.e., the pertur-
bation probabilities a,b, p satisfies
a(1−b)
b(1−a) = e
ε1 , p =
eε2
eε2 +1
(2)
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then PCKV-UE satisfies LDP with privacy budget
ε= max
{
ε2, ε1+ ln[2/(1+ e−ε2)]
}
(3)
where ε6 (ε1+ ε2) because of ε1 > 0 and 21+e−ε2 6 e
ε2 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Interpretation of Theorem 2. For two different key-value
pairs 〈k1,v1〉 and 〈k2,v2〉, where v1,v2 ∈ {1,−1}, the proba-
bility ratio of reporting the same output vector y should be
bounded to guarantee LDP. If k1 = k2 = k, then the probability
ratio only depends on the perturbation of the k-th elements
v1 and v2 (because other elements are the same, then the cor-
responding probabilities are canceled out in the ratio), thus
the upper bound of the probability ratio is apa(1−p) = e
ε2 . If
k1 6= k2, the ratio depends on both k1-th and k2-th elements,
thus the upper bound is apb/2 · 1−b1−a = 2e
ε1+ε2
eε2+1 = e
ε1+ln[2/(1+e−ε2 )]
(in the case of y[k1] = v1,y[k2] = 0 or y[k1] = 0,y[k2] = v2).
Finally, the total privacy budget is the log of the maximum
value of the upper bounds in the two cases.
Using Theorem 2 to Allocate Budget. Due to the non-
linear relationship among ε, ε1, and ε2 in Theorem 2, the
budget allocation of PCKV-UE is not direct as ε2 = ε− ε1.
We discuss the budget allocation in PCKV-UE as follows.
Assume ε > 0 is a given total privacy budget for composed
key-value perturbation. According to (3), both ε1 and ε2 are
less or equal to ε. If ε1 = ε, we have ε2 = 0. If ε2 = ε, we have
ε1 6 ε− ln[2/(1+ e−ε)] = ln[(eε+1)/2]. Therefore, ε1 and
ε2 can be allocated by (with respect to a variable θ)
ε1 = lnθ, ε2 = ln
1
2θe−ε−1 , for
eε+1
2
6 θ< eε (4)
where ε1 reaches its maximum value when given ε and ε2.
The optimized budget allocation, i.e., finding the optimal θ in
(4), will be discussed in Sec. 5.4.
No Tight Budget Composition for PrivKVM. One may
ask if PrivKVM can also be tightly composed like PCKV-
UE. Indeed, when the key is perturbed from 0→ 0 or 1→ 0
(corresponding to our Case 2) the reported value must be 0.
However, for the case of 0→ 1 (corresponding to our Case 3),
the value is perturbed from the estimated mean (discretized as
1 or −1) of the previous iteration with budget ε2c . Therefore,
when the output is 〈1, ·〉 (for all rounds), the consumed budget
of composed perturbation is ε2 + c · ε2c = ε, which means no
tighter composition for PrivKVM.
PCKV-GRR Mechanism. In GRR, the input is perturbed
into another item with specified probabilities, where the input
and output have the same domain. In PCKV-GRR, the key
is perturbed by GRR with privacy budget ε1, i.e., k→ k with
probability a = e
ε1
eε1+d′−1 and k→ i (i 6= k) with probability
b= 1−ad′−1 . The value is perturbed by two cases: if k→ i (i 6= k),
it is perturbed with privacy budget ε2; if k 6= k′, it is randomly
picked from {1,−1}with probability 0.5 respectively (similar
Algorithm 3 PCKV-GRR
Input: The set of key-value pairs S , perturbation probabilities a, p ∈ [ 12 ,1).
Output: one key-value pair y′ = 〈k′,v′〉, where k′ ∈K ′ and v′ ∈ {1,−1}.
1: Sample one key-value pair 〈k,v〉 from S by Algorithm 1.
2: Perturb 〈k,v〉 into 〈k′,v′〉 (probability b = 1−ad′−1 )
〈k′,v′〉=

〈k,v〉, w.p. a · p
〈k,−v〉, w.p. a · (1− p)
〈i,1〉 (i ∈K ′\k), w.p. b ·0.5
〈i,−1〉 (i ∈K ′\k), w.p. b ·0.5
3: Return y′ = 〈k′,v′〉.
ideas as in PCKV-UE). The implementation of PCKV-GRR
is shown in Algorithm 3.
Privacy Analysis of PCKV-GRR. Similar to PCKV-UE,
the mechanism PCKV-GRR also consumes less privacy bud-
get than ε1+ ε2. Besides the tight composition obtained from
the correlated perturbation, PCKV-GRR would get additional
privacy amplification benefit from Padding-and-Sampling,
though our sampling protocol is originally used to avoid pri-
vacy budget splitting (refer to Sec. 5.1).
Theorem 3 (Budget Composition of PCKV-GRR). As-
sume the privacy budgets for key and value perturbation of
PCKV-GRR (Algorithm 3) are ε1 and ε2 respectively, i.e., the
perturbation probabilities a,b and p are
a =
eε1
eε1 +d′−1 , b =
1
eε1 +d′−1 , p =
eε2
eε2 +1
(5)
then PCKV-GRR satisfies LDP with privacy budget
ε= ln
(
eε1+ε2 +λ
min{eε1 ,(eε2 +1)/2}+λ
)
(6)
where λ= (`−1)(eε2 +1)/2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Interpretation of Theorem 3. According to (6), the total
budget ε is a decreasing function of λ, where λ is an increas-
ing function of `, indicating that a larger ` provides stronger
privacy (smaller ε) of PCKV-GRR under the given ε1 and ε2.
Also, the above budget composition has two extreme cases.
First, if `= 1, then λ= 0 and (6) reduces to the budget com-
position of PCKV-UE in (3), which indicates that the two
mechanisms obtain the same benefit (tight budget compo-
sition) by adopting the correlated perturbations. Second, if
ε2 = 0, then λ= `−1 and (6) reduces to ε= ln eε1+`−1` , which
is the corresponding result in [23] for itemset data. The intu-
itive reason for such consistency is that the key perturbation
will consume all budget when ε2 = 0; thus, this special case of
key-value perturbation can be regarded as item perturbation.
No Privacy Benefits from Padding-and-Sampling for
PCKV-UE. Since Theorem 2 is independent of ` while The-
orem 3 is dependent on `, PCKV-UE does not have the same
privacy amplification benefits from Padding-and-Sampling
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as PCKV-GRR (both of which have been observed in [23]
for itemset data collection). The main reason is that PCKV-
UE outputs a vector that can contain multiple keys (i.e.,
multiple positions have 1). Take a toy example that only
considers the perturbation of key (i.e., ε2 = 0) with domain
K = {1,2,3,4} (then d = |K | = 4) and ` = 2, where the
output domain is Y = {0,1}d+`. In the worst case that de-
termines the upper bound of the probability ratio, we select
two neighboring inputs S1 = {1,2} and S2 = {3,4} (note
that LDP considers any set of keys as neighboring for one
user) and output vector y = [110000]. No matter which key is
sampled from S1, the probability of reporting y is the same:
p∗ = ab(1−b)4 (because x= [100000] or [010000]). Consid-
ering all sampling cases under sampling rate 1max{`,|S1|} , we
have Pr(y|S1) = 1` p∗ ·`= p∗, which is independent of `. Simi-
larly, Pr(y|S2) = b2(1−a)(1−b)3. Thus, the probability ratio
is Pr(y|S1)Pr(y|S2) =
a(1−b)
b(1−a) = e
ε1 , i.e., no privacy benefits from `. Note
that for other S1,S2, and y, the probability ratio might depend
on `, but they are not the worst case that determines the upper
bound. For PCKV-GRR, however, the output y can be only
one key. In the worst case, we select the above S1 and S2 but
y = {1}. Then, Pr(y|S1) = 1` a+(1− 1` )b because if x = {1}
(resp. x = {2}) is sampled from S1, the probability of report-
ing y is a (resp. b), where a> b. Also, Pr(y|S2) = 1` b · `= b
(no matter x = {3} or x = {4} is sampled, the probability of
reporting y is b). Thus, Pr(y|S1)Pr(y|S2) = 1+
a/b−1
` 6
a
b = e
ε1 , where
a larger ` will reduce this ratio (i.e., privacy amplification).
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 provide a tighter bound on
the total privacy guarantee than the sequential composition
(ε= ε1+ε2). However, in practice, the budgets are determined
in a reverse way: given ε (a constant), we need to allocate the
corresponding ε1 and ε2 before any perturbation. In Sec. 5.4,
we will discuss the optimized privacy budget allocation (i.e.,
how to determine ε1 and ε2 when ε is given) by minimizing
the estimation error that is analyzed in Sec. 5.3. In summary,
both the tight budget composition and optimized budget allo-
cation in our scheme will improve the privacy-utility tradeoff.
Note that PrivKVM [25] simply allocates the privacy budget
with ε1 = ε2 = ε/2 by sequential composition (Theorem 1).
5.3 Aggregation and Estimation
This subsection corresponds to step 4© 5© in Figure 2. Intu-
itively, the value mean of a certain key can be estimated by
the ratio between the summation of all true values and the
count of values regarding this key; however, the fake values
affect both the summation and the count. In PrivKVM [25],
since the count of values includes the fake ones, the mean
of fake values should be close to the true mean to guarantee
the unbiasedness of estimation. Therefore, a large number
of iterations are needed to make the fake values approach
the true mean. In our scheme, however, the fake values have
expected zero summation because they are assigned as −1 or
1 with probability 0.5 respectively. Therefore, we can use the
estimated frequency to approach the count of truly existing
values, thus only one round is needed.
Aggregation. After all users upload their outputs to the
server, the server will count the number of 1’s and −1’s that
supports k ∈K in output, denoted as n1 and n2 respectively
(the subscript k is omitted for brevity). Since the outputs of the
proposed two mechanisms have different formats, the server
computes n1 =Count(y[k] = 1) and n2 =Count(y[k] =−1)
in PCKV-UE, or computes n1 =Count(y′ = 〈k,1〉) and n2 =
Count(y′ = 〈k,−1〉) in PCKV-GRR. Then, n1 and n2 will be
calibrated to estimate the frequency and mean of key k ∈K .
Baseline Estimation Method. For frequency estimation,
we use the estimator in [23] for itemset data, which is shown
to be unbiased when each user’s itemset size is no more than
`. Since n1 + n2 is the observed count of users that possess
the key, we have the following equivalent frequency estimator
fˆk =
(n1+n2)/n−b
a−b · ` (7)
For mean estimation, since our mechanisms generate the fake
values as −1 or 1 with probability 0.5 respectively (i.e., the
expectation is zero), they have no contribution to the value
summation statistically. Therefore, we can estimate the value
mean by dividing the summation with the count of real keys.
According to Randomized Response (RR) in Sec. 3.2, the
calibrated summation is n1−n(1−p)2p−1 − n2−n(1−p)2p−1 = n1−n22p−1 . The
count of real keys which are still reported as possessed can
be approximated by n fˆka/` because the sampling rate is 1/`
and real keys are reported as possessed with probability a.
Therefore, the corresponding mean estimator is
mˆk =
(n1−n2)/(2p−1)
n fˆka/`
=
(n1−n2)(a−b)
a(2p−1)(n1+n2−nb) (8)
The following theorem analyzes the expectation and variance
of our estimators in (7) and (8) when each user has no more
than ` key-value pairs (the same condition as in [23]).
Theorem 4 (Estimation Error Analysis). If the padding
length ` > |Su| for all user u ∈ U; then, for frequency and
mean estimators in (7) and (8) of k ∈K , fˆk is unbiased, i.e.,
E[ fˆk] = f ∗k , and their expectation and variance are
Var[ fˆk] =
`2b(1−b)
n(a−b)2 +
` · f ∗k (1−a−b)
n(a−b) (9)
E[mˆk]≈ m∗k
[
1+
(1−b−δ)b
nδ2
]
(10)
Var[mˆk].
b+δ
nγ2
+
b(1−b)−δ
nδ2
·m∗k2 (11)
where parameters δ and γ are defined by
δ= (a−b) f ∗k /`, γ= a(2p−1) f ∗k /` (12)
The variance in (11) is an approximate upper bound and the
approximation in (10) and (11) is from Taylor expansions.
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Algorithm 4 Aggregation and Estimation with Correction
Input: Outputs of all users, domain of keys K , perturbation probabilities
a,b, p and padding length `.
Output: Frequency and mean estimation fˆk and mˆk for all k ∈K .
1: for k ∈K do
2: Count the number of supporting 1’s and −1’s for key k in outputs
from all users, denoted as n1 and n2.
3: Compute fˆk by (7) and correct it into [1/n,1].
4: Compute nˆ1 and nˆ2 by (13), and correct them into [0,n fˆk/`].
5: Compute mˆk by (14).
6: end for
7: Return fˆk and mˆk , where k ∈K .
Proof. See Appendix C. Note that Theorem 4 works for both
PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR.
Pros and Cons of the Baseline Estimator. The baseline
estimation method estimates frequency and mean by (7) and
(8) respectively. According to (10) and (11), for non-zero
constants δ and γ, when the user size n → +∞, we have
E[mˆk]−m∗k =
(1−b−δ)bm∗k
nδ2 → 0 (i.e., the bias of mˆk is pro-
gressively approaching 0) and Var[mˆk]→ 0, which means
mˆk converges in probability to the true mean m∗k . However,
when 1n( f ∗k /`)2
is not small, the large bias and large variance
would make the estimated mean mˆk far away from the true
mean, even out of the bound [−1,1]. Similarly, if Var[ fˆk] in
(9) is not very small, then for f ∗k → 0 or f ∗k → 1, the estimated
frequency fˆk may also be outside the bound [0,1]. Hence,
these outliers need further correction to reduce the estimation
error.
Improved Estimation with Correction. Since the value
perturbation depends on the output of key perturbation, we
first correct the result of frequency estimation. Considering
the corrected frequency cannot be 0 (otherwise the mean
estimation will be infinity), we clip the frequency values using
the range [1/n,1], i.e., set the outliers less than 1/n to 1/n and
outliers larger than 1 to 1. For the mean estimation, denote
the true counts of sampled key-value pair x = 〈k,1〉 and x =
〈k,−1〉 (the output of Algorithm 1) of all users as n∗1 and n∗2
respectively (the subscript k is omitted for brevity). Then we
have the following lemma for the estimation of n∗1 and n
∗
2.
Lemma 1. The unbiased estimators of n∗1 and n
∗
2 are[
nˆ1
nˆ2
]
= A−1
[
n1−nb/2
n2−nb/2
]
, where A =
[
ap− b2 a(1−p)− b2
a(1−p)− b2 ap− b2
]
(13)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that Lemma 1 works for both PCKV-UE and PCKV-
GRR. According to (13), we have
nˆ1− nˆ2 =
[
1 −1]A−1 [n1−nb/2n2−nb/2
]
=
n1−n2
a(2p−1)
then mˆk in (8) can be represented by nˆ1− nˆ2 and fˆk in (7)
mˆk = `(nˆ1− nˆ2)/(n fˆk) (14)
which means n∗1+n
∗
2 (the supporting number of 1 and −1 for
key k ∈K ) is estimated by n fˆk/`. Therefore, nˆ1 and nˆ2 should
be bounded by [0,n fˆk/`]. The aggregation and estimation
mechanism (with correction) is shown in Algorithm 4, where
the difference between PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR is only on
the aggregation step, which is caused by the different types
of output (one is a vector, another is a key-value pair).
5.4 Optimized Privacy Budget Allocation
In this section, we discuss how to optimally allocate budgets
ε1 and ε2 given the total privacy budget ε, which corresponds
to step 1© in Figure 2. The budget composition (Theorem 2
and Theorem 3) provides the relationship among ε, ε1, and
ε2. Intuitively, when the total privacy budget ε is given, we
can find the optimal ε1 and ε2 that satisfy the budget com-
position by solving an optimization problem of minimizing
the combined Mean Square Error (MSE) of frequency and
mean estimations, i.e., α ·MSE fˆk +β ·MSEmˆk . However, from
Theorem 4, Var[ fˆk] and Var[mˆk] depend on f ∗k and m
∗
k , whose
true values or even the approximate values are unknown in the
budget allocation stage (before any perturbation). Therefore,
in the following, we simplify this optimization problem to
obtain a practical budget allocation solution with closed-form.
Note that a larger ε1 can benefit both frequency and mean
estimations, but it restricts ε2 (which affects mean estimation)
due to limited ε.
Problem Simplification of Budget Allocation. In this pa-
per, we use Mean Square Error (MSE) to evaluate utility
mechanisms, i.e., the less MSE the better utility. Note that the
MSE of an estimator θˆ can be calculated by the summation
of variance and the square of its bias
MSEθˆ = Var[θˆ]+Bias
2 = Var[θˆ]+ (E[θˆ]−θ)2 (15)
When MSE is relatively large, the estimators will be corrected
by the improved estimation in Algorithm 4. Therefore, we
mainly consider minimizing MSE when it is relatively small,
i.e., (2p−1) and (a−b) are not very small, and n (the number
of users) is very large. Since f ∗k  1 for most cases in real-
world data, we have δ= (a−b) f ∗k /` 1. Denote
µ =
`2
n f ∗k
2 , g =
b
a2(2p−1)2 , h =
(1−b)b
(a−b)2 (16)
The MSEs in Theorem 4 can be approximated by
MSE fˆk = Var[ fˆk]≈ `
2 ·h/n (17)
MSEmˆk ≈ µ[g+(µh+1)hm∗k2]≈ µ(g+h ·m∗k2) (18)
where µ 1 with a large n. Note that MSEmˆk dominates
MSE fˆk because
`2
n /µ = f
∗
k
2 1. It is caused by the distinct
sample size of the two estimations, i.e., frequency is estimated
from all users (with user size n), while the value mean is esti-
mated from the users who possess a certain key (with user size
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Figure 4: Comparison of g and h under three budget allocation
methods for PCKV-UE, where MSEmˆk ≈ µ(g+h ·m∗k 2).
n f ∗k ). Therefore, our objective function α ·MSE fˆk +β ·MSEmˆk
mainly depends on MSEmˆk when α and β are in the same
magnitude. Motivated by this observation, we focus on min-
imizing MSEmˆk to obtain the optimized budget allocation.
Note that MSE fˆk only depends on ε1 (the more ε1 the less
MSE fˆk ), while MSEmˆk depends on both ε1 and ε2. However,
if ε1 approaches to the maximum, which corresponds to the
minimum MSE fˆk , then ε2 = 0 and MSEmˆk → ∞. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss the optimized privacy budget allocation
with minimum MSEmˆk in PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR.
Budget Allocation of PCKV-UE. In UE-based mecha-
nisms, the Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE) [22] was shown
to have the minimum MSE of frequency estimation under the
same privacy budget. Accordingly, the OUE-based perturba-
tion probabilities for key-value perturbation are
a = 1/2, b = 1/(eε1 +1), p = eε2/(eε2 +1) (19)
where the values of a and b correspond to the minimum
MSE fˆk under a given ε1 (budget for key perturbation). Fur-
thermore, by minimizing MSEmˆk , we have the following opti-
mized budget allocation of PCKV-UE.
Lemma 2 (Optimized Budget Allocation of PCKV-UE).
For a total privacy budget ε, the optimized budget allocation
for key and value perturbations can be approximated by
ε1 = ln[(eε+1)/2], ε2 = ε (20)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Interpretation of Lemma 2. According to the budget al-
location of PCKV-UE in (4), ε1 is an increasing function of θ,
while ε2 and the summation ε1+ ε2 = ln θ2θe−ε−1 are decreas-
ing functions of θ. From (20), ε1 and ε2 are optimally allo-
cated at θ= e
ε+1
2 (the minimum value), which corresponds to
the maximum summation ε1+ ε2. Moreover, under the opti-
mized budget allocation, the two values in the max operation
in (3) equal to each other, i.e., ε2 = ε1+ ln[2/(1+e−ε2)] = ε,
which indicates that the budgets are fully allocated.
Comparison with Other Allocation Methods. In order
to show the advantage of our optimized allocation in (20),
we compare it with two alternative methods. The first one
is naive allocation with ε1 = ε2 = ε/2 by sequential com-
position (which is used in PrivKVM). The second one is
non-optimized allocation with
ε1 = ln[(eε+ eε/2)/2], ε2 = ε/2 (21)
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Figure 5: Diagram of our optimized protocols (different types of
arrows represent perturbations with different probabilities).
which sets ε2 as ε/2 and computes ε1 by our tight budget
composition (Theorem 2). Considering MSEmˆk ≈ µ(g+ h ·
m∗k
2) in (18), we compare parameters g and h (with respect
to ε) under above three budget allocation methods, shown
in Figure 4. We can observe that the optimized allocation
has a much smaller g than the other two, though a little bit
larger h than the non-optimized one, which is caused by the
property that h is a monotonically decreasing function of ε1,
while ε1 and ε2 restrict each other. Note that in our optimized
allocation, the decrement of g dominates the increment of h.
Thus, MSEmˆk in (18) will be greatly reduced since m
∗
k
2 6 1.
Budget Allocation of PCKV-GRR. According to the bud-
get composition (Theorem 3) of PCKV-GRR, a larger padding
length ` will further improve the privacy-utility tradeoff of
key-value perturbation. Thus, given fixed total budget, the
allocated budget for key (or value) perturbation can be larger
(i.e., less noise will be added) under a larger `. The following
lemma shows the optimized budget allocation (related to `)
of PCKV-GRR with minimum MSEmˆk .
Lemma 3 (Optimized Budget Allocation of PCKV-GRR).
For a total privacy budget ε, the optimized budget allocation
for key and value perturbation can be approximated by
ε1 = ln [` · (eε−1)/2+1] , ε2 = ln [` · (eε−1)+1] (22)
Proof. See Appendix F.
According to (5) and (22), with a given total budget ε, the
perturbation probabilities in PCKV-GRR are
a =
`(eε−1)+2
`(eε−1)+2d′ , b =
1−a
d′−1 , p =
`(eε−1)+1
`(eε−1)+2 (23)
where d′ = d+ `. Note that when `= 1, the optimized budget
allocation in (22) reduces to the case of PCKV-UE in (20).
Interpretation of the Optimized Protocols. Under the
optimized budget allocation (Lemma 2 and Lemma 3), the
perturbation probabilities of proposed protocols are shown
in Figure 5. In optimized PCKV-UE, for two different input
vectors x1 and x2 (encoded from the sampled key-value pairs),
no matter they differ in one element (i.e., the sampled ones
have the same key but different values) or differ in two ele-
ments (i.e., the sampled ones have different keys), the upper
bound of the probability ratio of outputting the same vector
y is the same, i.e., 1©2© =
1©
5© ·
4©
3© = e
ε in Figure 5. In optimized
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PCKV-GRR, two of three different perturbation probabilities
in Algorithm 3 equal with each other, i.e., a(1− p) = b ·0.5 in
the optimized solution. Also, the optimized PCKV-GRR can
be regarded as the equivalent version of general GRR with
doubled domain size (each key can have two different values),
which can provide good utility on estimating the counts of
〈k,1〉 and 〈k,−1〉, say nk1 and nk2, where the mean of key k
can be estimated by nk1−nk2nk1+nk2 .
From the previous analysis, PCKV-GRR can get additional
benefit from sampling, thus it will outperform PCKV-UE for
a large `. On the other hand, the performance of PCKV-UE is
independent of the domain size d, thus it will have less MSE
than PCKV-GRR when d is very large. Therefore, the two
mechanisms are suitable for different cases. By comparing
parameters g and h in (16) of PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR
respectively, for a smaller MSE fˆk (i.e., a smaller h), if 2(d−
1) > `(4`− 1)(eε+ 1), then PCKV-UE is better; otherwise,
PCKV-GRR is better. For a smaller MSEmˆk (i.e., a smaller g
approximately), if 2d > `
(
4`(eε+1)
eε+3 −1
)
(eε+1), then PCKV-
UE is better; otherwise, PCKV-GRR is better. These can be
observed in simulation results (Sec. 6).
6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
mechanisms (PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR) and compare them
with the existing mechanisms (PrivKVM [25] and KVUE
[20]). We note that although KVUE [20] is not formally pub-
lished, we still implemented it with our best effort and in-
cluded it for comparison purposes.
Mechanisms for Comparison. In PrivKVM [25], the
number of iterations is set as c = 1 because we observe
that PrivKVM with a large number of iterations c will have
bad utility, which is caused by the small budget ε2c and thus
large variance of value perturbation in the last iteration (even
though the result is theoretically unbiased). However, imple-
menting PrivKVM with virtual iterations to predict the mean
estimation of remaining iterations can avoid budget split [25].
Thus, we also evaluate PrivKVM with one real iteration and
five virtual iterations (1r5v). In [20], multiple mechanisms
are proposed to improve the performance of PrivKVM, where
the most promising one is KVUE (which uses the same sam-
pling protocol as in PrivKVM). Note that the original KVUE
does not have corrections for mean estimation. For a fair com-
parison with PrivKVM, PCKV-UE, and PCKV-GRR (outliers
are corrected in these mechanisms), we use the similar cor-
rection strategy used in PrivKVM for KVUE.
Datasets. In this paper, we evaluate two existing mecha-
nisms (PrivKVM [25] and KVUE [20]) and our mechanisms
(PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR) by synthetic datasets and real-
world datasets. In synthetic datasets, the number of users is
n= 106, and the domain size is d = 100, where each user only
has one key-value pair (i.e., ` = 1), and both the possessed
Table 1: Real-World Datasets
Datasets # Ratings # Users # Keys Selected `
E-commerce [3] 23,486 23,486 1,206 1
Clothing [2] 192,544 105,508 5,850 2
Amazon [1] 2,023,070 1,210,271 249,274 2
Movie [4] 20,000,263 138,493 26,744 100
key of each user and the value mean of keys satisfy Uniform
(or Gaussian) distribution. The Gaussian distribution is gener-
ated with µ = 0,σkey = 50,σmean = 1, where samples outside
the domain (K or V = [−1,1]) are discarded. In real-world
datasets, each user may have multiple key-value pairs, i.e.,
` > 1 (how the selection of ` affects the estimation accuracy
has been discussed in Sec. 5.1). Table 1 summarizes the pa-
rameters of four real-world rating datasets (obtained from
public data sources) with different domain sizes and data dis-
tributions. The item-rating corresponds to key-value, and all
ratings are linearly normalized into [−1,1].
Evaluation Metric. We evaluate both the frequency and
mean estimation by the averaged Mean Square Error (MSE)
among all keys or a portion of keys
MSEfreq =
1
|X | ∑i∈X
( fˆi− f ∗i )2, MSEmean =
1
|X | ∑i∈X
(mˆi−m∗i )2
where f ∗i and m∗i (resp. fˆi and mˆi) are the true (resp. esti-
mated) frequency and mean, and X is a subset of the domain
K (the default X is K ). We also consider X as the set of
top N frequent keys (such as top 20 or top 50) because we
usually only care about the estimation results of frequent keys.
Also, infrequent keys do not have enough samples to obtain
the accurate estimation of value mean. All MSE results are
averaged with five repeats.
6.1 Synthetic Data
Overall Results. The averaged MSEs of frequency and mean
estimations are shown in Figure 6 (with domain size 100),
where the MSE is averaged by all keys (Figure 6a and 6b) or
the top 20 frequent keys (Figure 6c). For frequency estimation,
PrivKVM (c = 1) and PrivKVM (1r5v) have the same MSE
since the frequency is estimated by the first iteration. The pro-
posed mechanisms (PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR) have much
less MSE fˆk . For mean estimation, PrivKVM (1r5v) predicts
the mean estimation of remaining iterations without splitting
the budget, which improves the accuracy of PrivKVM (c = 1)
under larger ε. The MSEmˆk of PrivKVM (c = 1) does not
decrease any more after ε = 0.5 since PrivKVM (c = 1) al-
ways generates fake values as v = 0. The PrivKVM (1r5v)
with virtual iterations improves PrivKVM (c = 1), but the
estimation error is larger than other mechanisms. The MSEmˆk
in PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR is much smaller than other
ones when ε is relatively large (e.g., ε> 2), thanks to the high
accuracy of frequency estimation in this case. Also, the small
gap between the theoretical and empirical results validate the
correctness of our theoretical error analysis in Theorem 4.
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Figure 6: MSEs of synthetic data under two distributions, where the
left is MSE of frequency estimation and the right is MSE of mean
estimation. The theoretical MSEs (dashed lines) of PCKV-UE and
PCKV-GRR are calculated by Theorem 4. When ε is small, the gap
between empirical and theoretical results is caused by the correction
in the improved estimation (Algorithm 4), while our theoretical MSE
is analyzed for the baseline estimation without correction.
Influence of Data Distribution. By comparing the results
of PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR under different distributions in
Figure 6, MSEmˆk of all keys in Gaussian distribution is larger
than in Uniform distribution because the frequency of some
keys is very small in Gaussian distribution. However, MSEmˆk
of the top 20 frequent keys is much smaller because the fre-
quent keys have higher frequencies. Note that the distribution
has little influence on MSE fˆk in these mechanisms because
the user size used in frequency estimation is always n, while
the user size used in value mean estimation of k ∈K is n f ∗k .
Influence of Domain Size. The MSEs of frequency and
mean estimation with respect to different domain size d
(where ε = 1 or 5) are shown in Figure 7. We can observe
that MSE fˆk is proportional to the domain size d in PrivKVM,
KVUE, and PCKV-GRR. Note that the reasons for the same
observation are different. For PrivKVM and KVUE, the per-
turbation probabilities are independent of domain size, but
the large domain size would make sampling protocol (ran-
domly pick one index from the domain of keys) less possible
to obtain the useful information. For PCKV-GRR, the large
domain size does not influence the Padding-and-Sampling
protocol, but it will decrease the perturbation probabilities a
and b in (23) and enlarge the estimation error. However, the
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Figure 7: Varying domain size d (MSEs are averaged of the top 20
frequent keys).
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Figure 8: Precision of top frequent keys estimation.
large domain size does not affect the frequency estimation
of PCKV-UE. For the result of mean estimation, we have
similar observations. Note that MSEmˆk is not proportional to
the domain size because the correction of mean estimation
can alleviate the error. For PCKV-UE, the increasing MSEmˆk
when d < 100 is caused by the decreased true frequency when
d is increasing (note that σkey = 50 and samples outside the
domain are discarded when generating the data). The predic-
tion of PrivKVM (1r5v) with virtual iterations does not work
well for a large domain size under small ε.
Accuracy of Top Frequent Keys Selection. To evaluate
the success of the top frequent keys selection, we calculate
the precision (i.e., the proportion of correct selections over all
predicted top frequent keys) for different mechanisms, shown
in Figure 8 (precision in this case is the same as recall). For
the top 10 frequent keys under ε= 3, the precision of PCKV-
UE is over 60% even for a large d (i.e., misestimation is at
most 4 over the top 10 frequent keys). However, PrivKVM
and KVUE incorrectly select almost all top 10 frequent keys
when d = 2000. For the top 20 frequent keys under ε = 5,
PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR can correctly estimate 95% and
85% respectively even for d = 2000.
Comparison of Allocation Methods. In our PCKV frame-
work, the privacy-utility tradeoff is improved by both the
tighter bound in budget composition (Theorem 2 and Theo-
rem 3) and the optimized budget allocation (Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3). In order to show the benefit of our optimized allo-
cation, we compare the results of optimized method with two
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Figure 9: Comparison of three allocation methods in PCKV.
alternative allocation ones in Figure 9, where the correspond-
ing theoretical comparison has been discussed in Sec. 5.4.
The naive allocation is ε1 = ε2 = ε/2, and the non-optimized
allocation with tighter bound is represented in (21), which also
works for PCKV-GRR when `= 1. We can observe that for
both PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR, the allocation methods with
tighter bound (non-optimized and optimized) outperform the
naive one in the estimation accuracy of mean and frequency.
Even though MSE fˆk in optimized allocation is slightly greater
than the non-optimized one, it has much less MSEmˆk . Note
that the magnitude of MSE fˆk and MSEmˆk are different. For ex-
ample, when ε= 1, the gap of MSE fˆk between non-optimized
and optimized allocation in PCKV-UE is 4×10−6, but the gap
of MSEmˆk between them is 0.08. These observations validate
our theoretical analyses and discussions in Sec. 5.4.
6.2 Real-World Data
The results of four types of real-world rating datasets are
shown in Figure 10, where the MSEs are averaged over the
top 50 frequent keys. The parameters (number of ratings,
users, and keys) are listed in Table 1, where we select reason-
able ` for evaluation to compare with existing mechanisms
with naive sampling protocol (the advanced strategy of se-
lecting an optimized ` is discussed in Sec. 5.1). Under the
large domain size in real-world datasets, PrivKVM (1r5v)
with virtual iterations does not work well, thus we only show
the results of PrivKVM (c = 1). Compared with the results
of E-commerce dataset, the MSEs of Clothing dataset do not
change very much because all algorithms can get benefits
from the large n, which compensates the impacts from the
larger d or the larger `. Compared with the results of PCKV-
UE in Clothing dataset, MSE fˆk in Amazon dataset is smaller
(due to the large n) but MSEmˆk is larger (due to the small
true frequencies). In the first three datasets, PCKV-UE has
the best performance because ` is small and the large domain
size does not impact its performance directly. In the Movie
dataset, since PCKV-GRR can benefit more from a large `,
it outperforms PCKV-UE in both frequency and mean esti-
mation. Note that both PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR have less
MSEs compared with other mechanisms in Movie dataset.
Since PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR are suitable for different
cases, in practice we can select PCKV-UE or PCKV-GRR
by comparing the theoretical estimation error under specified
parameters (i.e., ε,d and `) as discussed in Sec. 5.4.
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(a) E-commerce dataset with n = 23,486, d = 1,206 and `= 1.
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(c) Amazon dataset with n = 1,210,271, d = 229,274 and `= 2.
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(d) Movie dataset with n = 138,493, d = 26,744 and `= 100.
Figure 10: MSEs of real-world datasets listed in Table 1.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, a new framework called PCKV (with two mech-
anisms PCKV-UE and PCKV-GRR) is proposed to privately
collect key-value data under LDP with higher accuracy of
frequency and value mean estimation. We design a correlated
key and value perturbation mechanism that leads to a tighter
budget composition than sequential composition of LDP. We
further improve the privacy-utility tradeoff via a near-optimal
budget allocation method. Besides the tight budget composi-
tion and optimized budget allocation, the proposed sampling
protocol and mean estimators in our framework also improve
the accuracy of estimation than existing protocols. Finally, we
demonstrate the advantage of the proposed scheme on both
synthetic and real-world datasets.
For future work, we will study how to choose an optimized
` in the Padding-and-Sampling protocol and extend the corre-
lated perturbation and tight composition analysis to consider
more general forms of correlation and other hybrid data types.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. For a key-value set S , denote the key-value pairs (raw
data) are 〈i,v∗i 〉 for all i ∈ S , where v∗i ∈ [−1,1]. Note that
i ∈ S means a key-value pair 〈i, ·〉 ∈ S . Denote the sam-
pled key-value pair by Padding-and-Sampling in Algorithm
1 as x = 〈k,v〉, where v ∈ {1,−1} (the discretized value).
According to Line-5 in Algorithm 1, we have v∗k = 0 for
k ∈ {d+1, · · · ,d′}, where d′ = d+ `. For vector x in PCKV-
UE, only the k-th element is v (1 or −1) while others are 0s.
Then, the probability of outputting a vector y is
Pr(y|S ,k) = Pr(y[k]|v∗k) ∏
i∈K ′\k
Pr(y[i]|x[i] = 0)
=
Pr(y[k]|v∗k)
Pr(y[k]|x[k] = 0) ·∏i∈K ′
Pr(y[i]|x[i] = 0)
According to Figure 3, the perturbation probabilities of the
k-th element from the raw value can be represented as
Pr(y[k]|v∗k) =

1+(2p−1)v∗k
2 ·a, if y[k] = 1
1−(2p−1)v∗k
2 ·a, if y[k] =−1
1−a, if y[k] = 0
where v∗k ∈ [−1,1]. For convenience, denote
Ψ(y,k) =
Pr(y[k]|v∗k)
Pr(y[k]|x[k] = 0) , Φ(y) = ∏i∈K ′
Pr(y[i]|x[i] = 0)
then we have Pr(y|S ,k) =Ψ(y,k) ·Φ(y) and
Ψ(y,k) =

(1+(2p−1)v∗k) · ab , if y[k] = 1
(1− (2p−1)v∗k) · ab , if y[k] =−1
1−a
1−b , if y[k] = 0
where a, p ∈ [ 12 ,1) and b ∈ (0, 12 ] (in Algorithm 2).
Case 1. For k ∈ {1,2, · · · ,d}, we have v∗k ∈ [−1,1] and
1−a
1−b 6
2pa
b
,
2(1− p)a
b
6 (1± (2p−1)v∗k) ·
a
b
6 2pa
b
then the upper bound and lower bound of Ψ(y,k) are
Ψupper =
2pa
b
, Ψlower = min
{
1−a
1−b ,
2(1− p)a
b
}
Case 2. For k ∈ {d+1, · · · ,d′}, we have v∗k = 0, then the
upper bound and lower bound of Ψ(y,k) are
Ψ′upper =
a
b
, Ψ′lower =
1−a
1−b
Note that Ψlower 6 Ψ′lower 6 Ψ′upper 6 Ψupper. Then, the
probability of perturbing S into y is bounded by
Pr(y|S) = η∑
k∈S
Pr(y|S ,k)
|S | +(1−η)
d′
∑
k=d+1
Pr(y|S ,k)
`
=Φ(y)
[
η
|S | ∑k∈S
Ψ(y,k)+
1−η
`
d′
∑
k=d+1
Ψ(y,k)
]
6Φ(y)
[
η
|S | · |S |Ψupper+
1−η
`
· `Ψ′upper
]
6Φ(y) ·Ψupper
where the last inequality holds since η = |S |max{|S |,`} ∈ (0,1]
andΨ′upper 6Ψupper. Similarly, Pr(y|S)>Φ(y) ·Ψlower holds.
Then, for two different key-value sets S1 and S2, we have
Pr(y|S1)
Pr(y|S2) 6
Φ(y) ·Ψupper
Φ(y) ·Ψlower =
Ψupper
Ψlower
=
2pa/b
min
{
1−a
1−b ,
2(1−p)a
b
}
= max
{
2p · a(1−b)
b(1−a) ,
p
1− p
}
= max
{
2eε1
1+ e−ε2
,eε2
}
= eε
where ε is defined in (3).
B Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. In PCKV-GRR, for an input S with pairs 〈i,v∗i 〉 for
all i ∈ S and an output y′ = 〈k′,v′〉 , denote the sampled pair
as x = 〈k,v〉. When the sampled key is k, the probability of
outputting a pair y′ = 〈k′,v′〉 is
Pr(y′|S ,k) =

1+(2p−1)v∗k
2 ·a, if k′ = k,v′ = 1
1−(2p−1)v∗k
2 ·a, if k′ = k,v′ =−1
b/2, if k′ 6= k
where v∗k = 0 for k ∈ {d+1, · · · ,d′}.
Case 1. If k′ ∈ S , then
Pr(y′|S) = η∑
k∈S
Pr(y′|S ,k)
|S | +(1−η)
d′
∑
k=d+1
Pr(y′|S ,k)
`
=
η
|S |
[
a · 1+(2p−1)v
∗
k′v
′
2
+(|S |−1)b
2
]
+(1−η)b
2
Considering v∗k′ ∈ [−1,1] and v′ ∈ {1,−1}, we have
Pr(y′|S)6 η|S |ap+(1−
η
|S | )
b
2
6 1
`
ap+(1− 1
`
)
b
2
(24)
where η|S | =
1
max{|S |,`} ∈ [ 1d , 1` ] and ap> 14 > b2 . Also,
Pr(y′|S)> η|S |a(1− p)+(1−
η
|S | )
b
2
(25)
Case 2. If k′ /∈ S , i.e., k′ ∈ {d+1, · · · ,d′}, then
Pr(y′|S) = η · b
2
+
1−η
`
[
a
2
+(`−1)b
2
]
<
1
`
[
a
2
+(`−1)b
2
]
<
1
`
ap+(1− 1
`
)
b
2
(26)
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where η= |S |max{|S |,`} ∈ [ 1` ,1], and a, p> 12 > b. Also,
Pr(y′|S) = η · b
2
+
1−η
`
[
a
2
+(`−1)b
2
]
> b
2
(27)
Bound of Probability Ratio. Denote Φ = Pr(y′|S). By
combining (24) and (26), the upper bound is
Φupper =
1
`
ap+(1− 1
`
)
b
2
According to (25) and (27), the lower bound can be discussed
by the following two cases.
Case 1. If a(1− p)< b2 , i.e., eε1 < e
ε2+1
2 , we have
Φlower =
η
|S |a(1− p)+(1−
η
|S | )
b
2
∣∣∣∣ η
|S |=
1
`
=
1
`
a(1− p)+(1− 1
`
)
b
2
where Φlower < b2 . Then, for any two different inputs S1 and
S2, the probability ratio is bounded by
Pr(y′|S1)
Pr(y′|S2) 6
Φupper
Φlower
=
1
` ap+(1− 1` ) b2
1
` a(1− p)+(1− 1` ) b2
=
ap
b +
`−1
2
a(1−p)
b +
`−1
2
=
eε1+ε2 +(`−1) eε2+12
eε1 +(`−1) eε2+12
(28)
Case 2. If a(1− p)> b2 , i.e., eε1 > e
ε2+1
2 , then Φlower =
b
2
Pr(y′|S1)
Pr(y′|S2) 6
Φupper
Φlower
=
1
` ap+(1− 1` ) b2
b
2
=
2eε1+ε2
`(eε2 +1)
+1− 1
`
=
eε1+ε2 +(`−1) eε2+12
` · eε2+12
(29)
By combining the results in (28) and (29), we have
Pr(y′|S1)
Pr(y′|S2) 6
eε1+ε2 +(`−1)(eε2 +1)/2
min{eε1 ,(eε2 +1)/2}+(`−1)(eε2 +1)/2
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Step 1. calculate the expectation and variance of
n1 and n2. Denote
q1 = a · [1+(2p−1)m∗k ]/2, q2 = a · [1− (2p−1)m∗k ]/2
where m∗k is the true mean of key k. For a user u ∈Uk (the set
of users who possess key k ∈ K ), denote the expected con-
tribution of supporting 1 and −1 as q∗u1 and q∗u2 respectively.
According to the perturbation steps of PCKV-UE in Figure 3
(note that PCKV-GRR has the similar perturbation), q∗u1 and
q∗u2 are computed by
q∗u1 = a · [1+(2p−1)v∗u]/2, q∗u2 = a · [1− (2p−1)v∗u]/2
where
∑u∈Uk q
∗
u1
|Uk| = q1 and
∑u∈Uk q
∗
u2
|Uk| = q2. Then the expected
contribution of supporting 1 of a group of users Uk is
EUk [n1] =
1
`∑u∈Uk q
∗
u1 =
1
`
|Uk|q1 = n f
∗
k
`
q1
where |Uk|= n f ∗k . And the corresponding variance is
VarUk [n1] =
1
` ∑u∈Uk
q∗u1(1−q∗u1) =
1
`
[
∑
u∈Uk
q∗u1− ∑
u∈Uk
q∗u1
2
]
6 1
`
[
∑
u∈Uk
q∗u1−
1
|Uk| ( ∑u∈Uk
q∗u1)
2
]
= n
f ∗k
`
q1(1−q1)
where ∑u∈Uk q
∗
u1
2 > 1|Uk| (∑u∈Uk q
∗
u1)
2 from Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality. Similarly, we can compute EUk [n2] and the upper
bound of VarUk [n2]. Then, for all users, the expectation and
the upper bound of variance are (t = 1 or 2)
E[nt ] = EUk [nt ]+EU\Uk [nt ] = n
f ∗k
`
qt +n(1− f
∗
k
`
)
b
2
Var[nt ]6 n
f ∗k
`
qt(1−qt)+n(1− f
∗
k
`
)
b
2
(1− b
2
)
where U\Uk denotes the set of users not in Uk. Note that
VarUk [n1]−VarUk [n2] =
1
` ∑u∈Uk
(q∗u1−q∗u2)(1−q∗u1−q∗u2)
= n
f ∗k
`
(q1−q2)(1−a) = n f
∗
k
`
(1−a)a(2p−1)m∗k
because of q∗u1 +q
∗
u2 = a and ∑u(q
∗
u1−q∗u2) = n f ∗k (q1−q2),
where q1−q2 = a(2p−1)m∗k . Then, for all users u ∈U,
Var[n1]−Var[n2] = n f
∗
k
`
(1−a)a(2p−1)m∗k
Var[n1+n2] = n
f ∗k
`
a(1−a)+n(1− f
∗
k
`
)b(1−b)
Note that n1 and n2 are correlated variables.
Step 2. calculate the expectation and variance of fre-
quency estimation. According to the frequency estimator in
(7), we have
E[ fˆk] =
E[n1+n2]/n−b
a−b `=
f ∗k
` a+(1−
f ∗k
` )b−b
a−b `= f
∗
k
Var[ fˆk] =
`2Var[n1+n2]
n2(a−b)2 =
`2b(1−b)
n(a−b)2 +
` · f ∗k (1−a−b)
n(a−b)
which are equivalent to the results for itemset data in [23]
(note that [23] focuses on the count ck = n f ∗k while we con-
sider the proportion f ∗k ).
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Step 3. calculate the expectation and variance of mean
estimation. From the multivariate Taylor Expansions of func-
tions of random variables [7], the expectation of quotient of
two random variables X and Y can be approximated by
E
[
X
Y
]
≈ E[X ]
E[Y ]
− CovX ,Y
E[Y ]2
+
E[X ]
E[Y ]3
·Var[Y ] (30)
Var
[
X
Y
]
≈ Var[X ]
E[Y ]2
− 2E[X ]CovX ,Y
E[Y ]3
+
E[X ]2
E[Y ]4
Var[Y ] (31)
For convenience, denote X = n1−n2,Y = n1+n2−nb, then
E[X ] = n
f ∗k
`
a(2p−1)m∗k , E[Y ] = n
f ∗k
`
(a−b)
The variances are
Var[X ] = Var[n1−n2] = 2(Var[n1]+Var[n2])−Var[n1+n2]
6 nb+n f
∗
k
`
[(a−b)−a2(2p−1)2m∗k2]
Var[Y ] = Var[n1+n2] = n
f ∗k
`
a(1−a)+n(1− f
∗
k
`
)b(1−b)
The covariance is
CovX ,Y = Cov[n1−n2,n1+n2]
= E[(n1−n2)(n1+n2)]−E[n1−n2]E[n1+n2]
= E[n21−n22]−
(
E[n1]2−E[n2]2
)
= Var[n1]−Var[n2]
= n
f ∗k
`
a(1−a)(2p−1)m∗k = (1−a) ·E[X ]
Note that only Var[X ] is computed by its upper bound, while
E[X ], E[Y ], Var[Y ] and CovX ,Y are computed by their ex-
act values. For convenience, denote δ = f
∗
k
` (a− b) and γ =
f ∗k
` a(2p−1). According to (8) and (30), we have
E[mˆk] =
(a−b)E[XY ]
a(2p−1) ≈
(a−b)E[X ]
a(2p−1)E[Y ]
[
1− 1−a
E[Y ]
+
Var[Y ]
E[Y ]2
]
= m∗k
[
1+
(1−b−δ)b
nδ2
]
Similarly, according to (8) and (31), we have
Var[mˆk] =
(a−b)2Var[XY ]
a2(2p−1)2 .
b+δ
nγ2
+
b(1−b)−δ
nδ2
·m∗k2
D Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. According to the perturbation mechanism, we have
E[n1] = n∗1ap+n∗2a(1− p)+(n−n∗1−n∗2)b/2
E[n2] = n∗1a(1− p)+n∗2ap+(n−n∗1−n∗2)b/2
which can be rewritten as[
E[n1]
E[n2]
]
= A
[
n∗1
n∗2
]
+
[
nb/2
nb/2
]
where
A =
[
ap− b2 a(1− p)− b2
a(1− p)− b2 ap− b2
]
According to the linear property, the expectation of nˆ1 and nˆ2
in (13) are[
E[nˆ1]
E[nˆ2]
]
= A−1
[
E[n1]−nb/2
E[n2]−nb/2
]
= A−1A
[
n∗1
n∗2
]
=
[
n∗1
n∗2
]
Note that
det(A) = (ap−b/2)2− (a(1− p)−b/2)2
= a(a−b)(2p−1)> 0
thus A−1 exists. Therefore, (nˆ1, nˆ2) are unbiased estimators
of (n∗1,n
∗
2).
E Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. According to budget allocation in (4) and perturba-
tion probabilities setting of OUE, we can rewrite a,b, p with
respect to θ
a =
1
2
, b =
1
eε1 +1
=
1
θ+1
, p =
1
1+ e−ε2
=
eε
2θ
where e
ε+1
2 6 θ< eε. Then, g and h in (16) can be rewritten
as the function of θ
g(θ) =
4
(θ+1)(eε/θ−1)2 , h(θ) =
4θ
(θ−1)2
and their derivative functions are
g′(θ) =
4θ[θ2+(θ+2)eε]
(θ+1)2(eε−θ)3 > 0, h
′(θ) =−4(θ+1)
(θ−1)3 < 0
For convenience, denote
Φ(θ) = MSEmˆk/µ = g(θ)+h(θ) ·m∗k2 (32)
and θ0 = e
ε+1
2 , which is the minimum value of θ. In the fol-
lowing, we show that Φ(ε1) is an approximately increasing
function of ε1.
Considering both g′(θ) and h′(θ) are increasing functions
of θ, we have
Φ′(θ) = g′(θ)+h′(θ) ·m∗k2 > g′(θ0)+h′(θ0) ·m∗k2
=
16(eε+3)
(eε−1)3 ·
[
(eε+1)(3e2ε+12eε+1)
(eε+3)3
−m∗k2
]
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(a) The value of Ψ(ε) in (33), where
the positive Ψ(ε) − m∗k 2 indicates
that MSEmˆk is a monotonically in-
creasing function of θ.
100 101
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104
(b) The value of Φ(θ) in (32) when
m∗k
2 = 1 (the worst case), where
Φ(θ) = MSEmˆk/µ (µ is a constant)
and θ ∈ [ eε+12 ,eε) according to (4).
Figure 11: Illustrations in Appendix E.
where −16 m∗k 6 1. Denote
Ψ(ε) =
(eε+1)(3e2ε+12eε+1)
(eε+3)3
(33)
whose value is plotted in Figure 11 (a), where 0.5<Ψ(ε)< 3
for all ε> 0, andΨ(0.85)≈ 1. Therefore, we have Φ′(θ)>
0 for all ε1 ∈ [ln eε+12 ,ε) when Ψ(ε) > m∗k2, which always
holds if m∗k
2 6 0.5 or ε> 0.85. Moreover, with different ε, the
value of Φ(θ) in (32) when m∗k
2 = 1 (the worst case) is shown
in Figure 11 (b), which validates that Φ(θ) is approximately
increasing function of θ for all possible ε and m∗k . Therefore,
θ0 = e
ε+1
2 is the optimal solution of minimizing MSE[mˆk] =
µ ·Φ(θ). By substituting θ= eε+12 into (4), we finally obtain
the budgets as in (20).
F Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. According to (5) and (16), we have
g =
b
a2(2p−1)2 =
e−ε1 +(d′−1)e−2ε1
( 21+e−ε2 −1)2
(34)
h =
(1−b)b
(a−b)2 =
eε1 +d′−2
(eε1 −1)2 (35)
where d′ = d+ ` and h′(ε1)< 0. In the following, we discuss
the optimal ε1 in two cases.
Case 1. If `= 1, then (6) reduces to (3) because of λ= 0,
thus we can obtain the same result as in PCKV-UE
ε1 = lnθ, ε2 = ln
1
2θe−ε−1 , for
eε+1
2
6 θ< eε (36)
then we have
g(θ) =
θ+(d′−1)
(eε−θ)2 , h(θ) =
θ+d′−2
(θ−1)2
where g′(θ) > 0 and h′(θ) < 0. Similar to the proof in Ap-
pendix E, the optimal solution of minimizing g(θ)+h(θ) ·m∗k2
can be approximated at θ= e
ε+1
2 , then ε1 = ln
eε+1
2 and ε2 = ε.
Case 2. If ` > 1, denote θ= eε1 and let ε2 = 0 in (6), then
eε =
θ+(`−1)
`
⇒ θ= ` · (eε−1)+1
Thus, to guarantee ε1,ε2 > 0 under a given ε, variable θ should
in the following range
1< θ< ` · (eε−1)+1 (37)
On the other hand, let θ = eε1 = (eε2 + 1)/2 in (6), i.e., the
two values in the min operation equal with each other, then
θ= ` · (eε−1)/2+1. For the parameter g calculated in (34),
we discuss its derivative function g′(θ) in the two ranges
• For 1< θ6 ` · (eε−1)/2+1, we have
min{eε1 ,(eε2 +1)/2}= eε1 ⇒ eε = e
ε1+ε2 +λ
eε1 +λ
where λ= (`−1)(eε2 +1)/2. Then,
2
1+ e−ε2
−1 = e
ε−1
eε+1
· [1+(`−1)/θ]
⇒ g(θ) =
(
eε+1
eε−1
)2
· θ+d
′−1
(θ+ `−1)2
where g′(θ)< 0 and d′ = d+ `.
• For ` · (eε−1)/2+16 θ< ` · (eε−1)+1, we have
eε =
eε1+ε2 +λ
(eε2 +1)/2+λ
then
2
1+ e−ε2
−1 = [`(eε−1)− (θ−1)]/θ
⇒ g(θ) = θ+d
′−1
[`(eε−1)− (θ−1)]2
where g′(θ)> 0.
Therefore, g(θ) approaches to the minimum value at θ= ` ·
(eε−1)/2+1. Note that g(θ)→+∞when θ→ ` ·(eε−1)+1
(the upper bound in (37)), and h(θ)→+∞ when θ→ 1 (the
lower bound in (37)). Similar to the proof in Appendix E,
the optimal solution of minimizing g(θ)+h(θ) ·m∗k2 can be
approximated at θ= ` · (eε−1)/2+1. Then, we have
ε1 = ln[` · (eε−1)/2+1], ε2 = ln [` · (eε−1)+1]
By combining the results in Case 1 (when `= 1) and Case
2 (when ` > 1), we obtain (22).
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